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I. INTRODUCTION

D

ENISE Hawkins and Darla Grese were in a committed, unmarried same-sex relationship when they decided to have a child together.1 Darla became pregnant with donor sperm and gave
birth in 2007. For several years, Darla and Denise raised the child together in the home that they shared. But in 2014, Darla and Denise ended
their relationship. At that point, the two women continued to share
parenting responsibilities as part of an informal custody arrangement.2
Two years into this arrangement, however, Darla refused to allow Denise to see their child. Cut off from the son she had been raising for almost a decade, Denise went to court and filed a petition for custody. Two
psychologists, as well as a guardian ad litem, testified that ending the
child’s relationship with Denise would inflict psychological and emotional
harm on him. In fact, the court found that the child had developed behavioral problems as a consequence of his separation from Denise.3
Nonetheless, the Virginia Court of Appeals determined that Denise
was not a legal parent and thus was not entitled to custody or visitation
over Darla’s objections.4 Because Denise was not a biological parent, was
not married to the biological mother, and had not adopted the child, Virginia law did not recognize her as a legal parent. Moreover, the court
asserted that Darla, as the child’s biological mother, had constitutional
* Anne Urowsky Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Joanna Grossman for helpful comments.
1. Hawkins v. Grese, 809 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 446.
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authority to exclude non-parents.5 Accordingly, she was entitled, as a
constitutional matter, to shut Denise out of their son’s life. The court severed the child’s relationship with one of his parents, even though it was
clear that he would be harmed.6
In the decades before the Virginia court’s ruling, as I show in Part II of
this essay, assigning value to biological bonds justified legal recognition of
nonmarital parent–child relationships that for too long had been stigmatized and excluded. For centuries, the children of unmarried parents enjoyed no rights to parental support or inheritance. Unmarried parents in
many ways were legal strangers to their children. In the U.S., in the second half of the twentieth century, biological connection emerged as a basis on which to protect parents and children in nonmarital families, as a
matter of both constitutional doctrine and family law. Judges and
lawmakers concluded that unmarried biological parents and their children must enjoy rights and obligations that married parents and their
children possess.
Yet for the twenty-first-century Virginia court, as I show in Part III, the
value of biological bonds justified the decision to sever a nonmarital parent–child relationship. Appeals to biological connection could construct
the nonbiological parent as a legal stranger to her child and could grant
the biological parent the right to exclude the child’s other parent. Identifying the Janus-faced nature of biology, this brief essay examines how
biological parentage, which served as a mechanism by which to repudiate
“illegitimacy” and protect nonmarital parent–child relationships, today
serves to justify new forms of illegitimacy and to separate unmarried parents from their children.
While the nonrecognition of unmarried nonbiological parents presents
an urgent problem for many kinds of families, the paradigm situation involves an unmarried female same-sex couple raising a child conceived
through assisted reproduction, like the family in Hawkins. In the era that
Professor Lawrence Friedman examines in his contribution to this symposium, the legal system and the society failed to respect and protect the
status of the unmarried biological mother and her child.7 Today, largely
because of the legal and cultural developments that underwrote the repudiation of illegitimacy, the tie between the unmarried biological mother
and her child is granted legal recognition and social status. Instead, it is
the unmarried nonbiological mother who struggles for legal and social
acceptance of her relationship to her child. Yet, just as Friedman documents the ways in which social norms outpaced and shaped changes in
the legal order with respect to unmarried mothers,8 shifting attitudes
about family formation by same-sex couples are driving reforms to modern parentage law. Part IV identifies a growing consensus among courts
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 446–49.
See Lawrence Friedman, No Name, 74 SMU L. REV. 235 (2021).
See id. at 6–24.
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and legislatures to repudiate what Professor Nancy Polikoff has termed
“the new ‘illegitimacy’”9 by expanding parental recognition to nonbiological parents in nonmarital families.
II. ILLEGITIMACY’S PAST: BIOLOGY AS INCLUSION
For centuries, as Friedman makes clear, Anglo–American law treated
nonmarital children as “illegitimate.”10 When an unmarried woman gave
birth to a child, the child was deemed fillius nulius—the child or heir of
nobody—and had no legal parent–child relationships.11 Over time, as
Friedman describes, the common law came to regard nonmarital children
as legal children, entitled to parents exercising custodial and financial responsibility.12 Whereas marriage once defined and limited legal parent–child bonds, unmarried parents and their children now could claim
legitimate ties.
Friedman focuses on English law and society, but a similar transition
occurred in the U.S.13 For many years, marriage cabined parenthood. A
child born to a married woman had two legal parents—the woman and
her husband—and was entitled to their support. A child born to an unmarried woman was “illegitimate” and lacked legally enforceable rights
with respect to her parents.14 While unmarried mothers came to exercise
custodial responsibility for their children,15 those children had no legally
enforceable right to paternal support or inheritance.16
In the U.S., a combination of constitutional developments and family
law reforms altered this landscape.17 Some states engaged in various reforms by the second half of the twentieth century, but many maintained
harsh illegitimacy regimes and required unmarried fathers to formally pe9. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721,
722–23 (2012).
10. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 239.
11. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 3d
ed. 1768); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 212 (John M. Gould ed.,
14th ed. Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1896).
12. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 254–56.
13. Although, as Professor Joanna Grossman notes, “American law never took as
harsh an approach to the status of illegitimate children as English law . . . .” Joanna L.
Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 693 (2012).
14. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197 (G. Edward White ed., 1985) (“The [illegitimate
child] had no recognized legal relations with his or her parents, particularly not those of
inheritance, maintenance, and custody. Nor did the illicit couple have any rights or duties
toward their spurious issue.”).
15. Id. at 207. State law increasingly recognized rights and obligations between unmarried mothers and their children. See id.
16. See id. at 197–98; Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501, 504 (1852) (explaining that men
were “under no legal obligation to support” their illegitimate children). Nonetheless, some
states required men to contribute to the financial support of their nonmarital children. See
GROSSBERG, supra note 14, at 215–18.
17. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 1–23 (2011).
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tition for a legal relationship, by guardianship or adoption for instance.18
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court held that nonmarital parents and
children possessed relationship interests of constitutional magnitude.19 In
the late 1960s, the Court rejected state laws that distinguished between
marital and nonmarital children, recognizing, in two decisions, rights
flowing from the relationship between a child and his unmarried
mother.20
A few years later, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court extended constitutional protection to an unmarried father’s parent–child relationship.21
Traditionalists sought to use marriage as the dividing line between lawful
and illegitimate family relations and to bolster the moral superiority of
the marital family. As the state of Illinois argued in Stanley, the marital
father “creat[es] the basic family unit upon which our society is based,”22
while the nonmarital father “establishes no fixed family unit, but only a
transient relationship.”23 If Stanley wanted legal parent–child relationships, he should have married the children’s mother. In the absence of
marriage, Illinois argued, “the father of a child born out of wedlock” can
gain custody “pursuant to an adoption proceeding initiated by him for
that purpose.”24 Unmarried fathers, the state explained, must “subject
themselves to a legal proceeding . . . . [that] approximates an adoption or
guardianship proceeding instituted by a person bearing no blood relationship to the child and in which the best interest showing is required.”25
Biological parenthood provided the framework through which to repudiate the discriminatory treatment of unmarried fathers. Progressive advocates argued that the biological father should not have to take a formal
step, such as marriage or adoption, to enjoy a legally protected relationship with his child. For the Stanley Court, investing biological ties with
constitutional significance provided a way to vindicate nonmarital family
relations.26 Quoting its 1968 decision in Levy, which repudiated “illegitimacy,” the Court declared that “familial bonds [in nonmarital families]
were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a
18. See GROSSBERG, supra note 14, at 228–33.
19. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Gurantee & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
20. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71–72; Glona, 391 U.S. at 75–76.
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court decided Stanley on equal protection and procedural due process grounds. See id. at 657–58. An unmarried father, unlike
“all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged,” was deprived of a hearing
regarding his fitness. Id. at 649. Stanley, however, is regularly placed in a line of substantive
due process precedents, standing for the substantive liberty that an unmarried father possesses in the relationship with his child. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394
n.16 (1979) (citing Stanley in connection with the father’s claim “that he was denied substantive due process”).
22. Brief for Respondent at 23, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).
23. Id. at 24.
24. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 106
3/4, par. 62), rev’d sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
25. Brief for Respondent, supra note 22, at 31.
26. See Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261,
283–84 (2020).
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more formally organized family unit.”27
The Court’s ruling in favor of the father in Stanley ushered in a new era
of protection for nonmarital parents and children.28 In defining legal
parenthood, states were required to extend some level of parental recognition to unmarried fathers.29 While the Court framed biological connection as the starting point of the father–child bond for constitutional
purposes, it did not conclude that the biological tie, standing alone, merited constitutional protection.30 The unmarried biological father had the
unique opportunity to form a relationship with his child, but he must
“grasp the opportunity” before his parental status would merit constitutional protection.31 As the Court explained in its 1983 decision in Lehr v.
Robertson, a substantive liberty interest attaches only to an unmarried
biological father who “demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.”32 Courts and commentators refer to this constitutional standard as “biology-plus.”33 As Professor Melissa Murray has
argued, even as the Court vindicated unmarried fathers, marriage remained the gold standard; the unmarried father whose claim the Court
credited “had not only behaved like a father; he had behaved like a
husband.”34
The requirement that the unmarried father “grasp the opportunity”
that his biological connection affords served as a way to limit the recognition of nonmarital parent–child relations. Those seeking to challenge
marital supremacy and provide more comprehensive protection to unmarried fathers sought to make the biological tie, standing alone, more
significant as a constitutional matter. Attorneys for Lehr, the unmarried
father, argued that “the liberty interest at stake is created by the biological relationship between parent and child.”35 The Court’s opinion in Lehr
was written by Justice Stevens, who had dissented in the Court’s previous
decision protecting the rights of an unmarried father on constitutional
grounds.36 Justices who had resisted rights for unmarried fathers were
crafting a standard that was difficult for many men to meet, including the
father in Lehr, whose claim the Court rejected.37 Justices who would have
27. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
28. See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1647, 1649–50 (2015).
29. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2276–78
(2017).
30. See NeJaime, supra note 26, at 295–96.
31. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978).
32. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
33. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 361 & n.78 (2012); see also Katharine K. Baker, The DNA
Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037,
2060–62 (2016).
34. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 402 (2012) (emphasis added).
35. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (No. 81-1756).
36. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 414 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267–68.
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extended more comprehensive protection to unmarried fathers dissented
in Lehr and sought to make biological connection matter more. Justice
White, for example, echoed Lehr’s arguments and asserted that “[t]he
‘biological connection’ is itself a relationship that creates a protected
interest.”38
Importantly, the constitutional significance of biological connection
differed for women and men. The Court required “biology-plus” from an
unmarried father but treated a mother’s legal status as flowing inevitably
from biological facts—namely, pregnancy and birth.39 As the Court asserted in Lehr: “The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense
her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father’s parental
claims must be gauged by other measures.”40
Constitutional precedents required states to reform their parentage
systems to include unmarried biological fathers. But rather than carefully
distinguish between biological fathers based on whether they “grasped
the opportunity” to form a parental relationship, states extended rights
and responsibilities to biological fathers based largely on their biological
tie to the child. In other words, states protected the status of men who
would not merit constitutional protection under the Court’s precedents.
The constitutional standard of biology-plus appeared to matter primarily
if the unmarried biological father sought to challenge the child’s adoption
or displace another man acting as a father—usually the mother’s husband.41 Otherwise, biological fathers could establish their parentage by
attesting to their genetic parentage or using blood test evidence. The 1973
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which many states adopted, connected
biological paternity to legal parentage in explaining that “blood test evidence will go far toward stimulating voluntary settlements of actions to
determine paternity.”42
States, however, were not acting simply to protect unmarried fathers’
rights. They also sought to vindicate the rights of nonmarital children,
who the Court repeatedly ruled had the same interest in paternal support
that marital children enjoyed.43 The 1973 UPA aimed to extend legal recognition “equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the
marital status of the parents.”44 Establishing paternity was necessary to
secure an award of child support from the father of a nonmarital child.
Seeking to make such establishment straightforward, states authorized
mothers, children, and the government to impose parentage on biological
fathers based on biological evidence alone.45 Ultimately, biological par38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Mills v.
44.
45.

Id. at 272 (White, J. dissenting).
See id. at 260 & n.16 (majority opinion).
Id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397).
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anderson, 624 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 2006) (adoption).
Id.
See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983);
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
See id. § 12 cmt.
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entage became the organizing principle for a more just parentage regime
that sought to eradicate discrimination against nonmarital children.
Of course, more straightforward paternity establishment promoted
other government interests. Using biological connection to determine paternity, and thus to collect child support, aided the government’s efforts
to privatize dependency.46 States, increasingly empowered by federal legislation and regulations, sought to establish legal parentage for unmarried
biological fathers and to enforce child support orders against such men.47
In response to federal intervention, states developed acknowledgments of
paternity to easily and quickly identify legal fathers for nonmarital children. As the 2002 UPA explained: “The mother of a child and a man
claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man’s paternity.”48 Federal
law required that states treat the acknowledgment—an administrative
form signed by the birth mother and the man purporting to be the biological father—as equivalent to a court judgment.49
When a mother applies for means-tested government benefits for her
and her child, states are incentivized by federal legislation to initiate complaints against the biological father—to establish paternity if an acknowledgment has not been signed and to pursue child support.50 The child’s
mother must cooperate in the state’s action.51 And much of the money, if
any, recouped from the father is used to reimburse the government for
the aid it distributed, rather than given to the mother and child.52 From
this perspective, biological connection, which had been the basis for progressive reform vindicating nonmarital families, also provides a logic for
the state to regulate nonmarital procreation, subject mothers and fathers
to oversight, and shift the government’s financial obligations to private
actors.
It is important to recognize that even as biological connection has become a basis on which to legally recognize a wide range of nonmarital
parent–child relations, federal and state laws continue to draw troubling
distinctions between marital and nonmarital biological children.53 None46. See generally Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2344
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. code).
47. See 102 Stat. 2344; 110 Stat. 2105.
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
49. Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 476 (2012).
50. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666–667). As Part D of the Social Security Act, Congress
created the Office of Child Support Enforcement in 1975. Social Services Amendment of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 651–652).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-169 (2020).
52. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 654(29); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-169; State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Kan. 1993).
53. For example, federal law regulating derivative citizenship makes it more difficult
for a child to acquire citizenship through a nonmarital citizen father than through a marital
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theless, biological connection was constructed as a potent remedy—both
in constitutional doctrine and family law—for the nonrecognition of
nonmarital parent–child relations. As the next Part shows, that remedy
produced the very structure that today creates and perpetuates new
forms of illegitimacy.
III. ILLEGITIMACY’S PRESENT: THE EXCLUSIONARY
MEANING OF BIOLOGY
To defend marriage’s primacy, traditionalists once rejected biological
connection as a sufficient basis for parentage. Today, opponents of a
more expansive parentage regime valorize biology in ways that exclude
parents and children from legal recognition. They present biological connection not as a recent progressive intervention in parentage law but instead as a timeless truth. Law, on this view, merely reflects a natural and
pre-political status.
As the long history of illegitimacy demonstrates, the law for centuries
refused to recognize many biological parent-child relationships. At the
same time, Anglo–American law recognized nonbiological parent–child
relationships absent adoption. In cabining parentage within marriage, the
law authorized the recognition of nonbiological father–child bonds. The
marital presumption, also referred to as the presumption of legitimacy,
treated the husband as the father of the child to whom his wife gave birth,
even if the husband was not in fact the biological father. Given the high
cost of illegitimacy, the law made the marital presumption practically
conclusive.54
Even as the circumstances under which the marital presumption can be
challenged have grown, the nonbiological operation of the presumption
has persisted. In fact, in adjudicating a contest between a nonbiological
father who claimed the marital presumption and the unmarried biological
father who sought to establish his paternity, the U.S. Supreme Court in
1989 not only permitted but defended the power of marriage to confer
parentage on a nonbiological father.55 In his plurality opinion in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia read the Court’s precedents to stand for
“the historic respect . . . traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family.”56 To extend protection to the unmarried biological father, Scalia reasoned, would unduly “deny protection to
a marital father.”57
citizen father. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the
Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2136 (2014). State
probate law as well continues to distinguish marital and nonmarital father-child relationships for inheritance purposes. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma,
and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 357–60 (2011).
54. See, e.g., Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453, 454 (1861).
55. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (plurality opinion).
56. Id. at 123.
57. Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).
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In the second half of the twentieth century, family law adapted the
marital presumption—and specifically its use in recognizing nonbiological
parentage—to assisted reproduction. Through case law and legislation,
states recognized husbands as legal fathers when their wives gave birth to
children conceived with donor sperm.58 So long as the sperm was used by
a married woman, the donor was not the child’s legal father but instead
merely a source of genetic material.59
In an age of marriage equality, courts and legislatures have confronted
the application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples. When a
woman in a married same-sex couple gives birth to a child conceived with
donor sperm, her wife should be treated as the child’s legal parent. State
legislators have revised their statutory marital presumptions to recognize
the individual, rather than the man, married to the woman who gives
birth.60 And most courts that have considered the question have held that
the nonbiological mother is a legal parent.61 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
its 2017 Pavan v. Smith decision, ordered Arkansas to issue birth certificates that list both women in a married same-sex couple as parents when
one of them gives birth to a child conceived with donor sperm.62 On this
view, the marital presumption reflects not biological parentage but a social understanding of parenthood—aiming to protect the relationships
that children have with those who exercise responsibility for their care.63
Even so, some opponents of LGBTQ equality have continued to press
biological arguments to oppose application of the marital presumption to
married same-sex couples.64
Marriage long authorized the legal recognition of nonbiological fathers
and today recognizes nonbiological mothers.65 Outside of marriage, as we
have seen, biological connection became the foundation for parental recognition.66 It is not surprising, then, that unmarried nonbiological parents
and their children are subject to especially harsh treatment. Today, parents who are not married to the birth parent and have not adopted struggle for parental recognition without a biological tie. Indeed, the very
attribute that facilitated law’s repudiation of illegitimacy has become the
justification for what Polikoff has labeled “the new ‘illegitimacy.’”67 The
58. See NeJaime, supra note 29, at 2292–93.
59. See id. at 2296.
60. See id. at 2294–95.
61. See id. at 2295.
62. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017) (per curiam).
63. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 350–54 (Iowa
2013).
64. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–31, Box v. Henderson, 141 S. Ct. 953
(2020) (No. 19-1385), 2020 WL 3316793.
65. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078–79.
66. See NeJaime, supra note 26, at 295–96.
67. See Polikoff, supra note 9, at 722 (“[O]btaining parental rights based upon the
legal relationship between . . . two mothers, without simultaneously creating parentage for
a partner who is not married to a birth mother, . . . revives the discredited distinction
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ children.”). While my focus is on the legal treatment
of unmarried nonbiological parents generally, the treatment of “the new ‘illegitimacy’” by
Polikoff and other scholars largely has focused on lesbian mothers in particular—a critical
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nonbiological parent’s lack of a genetic tie justifies her treatment as a
legal stranger to her child.68 The biological parent’s special status, as a
matter of both constitutional doctrine and family law, justifies her ability
to exclude the child’s nonbiological parent. Given biology’s potent role
on both sides of the parental ledger, the problem presented by the new
illegitimacy appears even more intractable.
Now, as then, questions of equality and inequality shape understandings of illegitimacy. As Friedman shows, gender and class structured the
meanings and implications of illegitimacy in nineteenth-century England.69 Legal and social condemnation of illegitimacy served as a means
to punish female sexuality and to insulate upper-class men from claims on
their property.70 In the U.S., where “children of a slave mother were
themselves slaves from birth”71 regardless of the identity of the father,
the illegitimacy regime propped up slavery and licensed sexual exploitation of black women by white men.72 Since then, the regulation and
meaning of illegitimacy have remained critical to race- and class-based
subordination.73
The lack of recognition for nonbiological parent–child relationships
does not fall equally on all parents and children. It falls most heavily on
LGBTQ parents and their children.74 Same-sex couples are not similarly
situated to different-sex couples with respect to sexual procreation and
biological parenthood; they “necessarily include a parent without a gestational or genetic tie to the child, and thus are especially vulnerable in a
parentage regime where recognition turns on biological connection.”75 A
parentage regime that premises parental recognition on biological connection does not furnish equality to same-sex couples, even if such a regime treats same-sex and different-sex couples the same.
Nonbiological parents in same-sex couples are routinely told they
should remedy their lack of parental recognition through the formal legal
statuses now available to them in an age of LGBTQ equality. They can
secure parentage by marrying the biological parent before the child’s
birth or by adopting after the child’s birth. Today, marriage in the U.S. is
increasingly correlated with race and class. While childrearing rates
among married and unmarried individuals in the U.S. are similar, those
raising children inside a marital family tend to be more white, higher incategory of nonbiological parents to which I also direct attention in this essay. See, e.g.,
Grossman, supra note 13, at 672 (describing the ‘“new ‘illegitimacy’” as “a regime in which
the rights and welfare of the children of lesbians are dependent on the marital status of
their parents, reminiscent of an almost forgotten era in which the same was widely true of
all children”).
68. See Polikoff, supra note 9, at 722.
69. See Friedman, supra note 7.
70. Id. at 3–5, 8.
71. Id. at 25.
72. See id.
73. See Appleton, supra note 33, at 351–53; Murray, supra note 34, at 414-16.
74. See NeJaime, supra note 29, at 2297.
75. Id.
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come, and better educated than their unmarried counterparts.76 The
other option, adoption, is a costly, invasive, and time-consuming process.77 And many parents do not realize they need to adopt their own
children.78
More importantly, requiring such formal steps reflects and carries forward not only the discriminatory treatment of nonmarital parents and
children but also the exclusion of LGBTQ people from legal constructions of the family. While both parents in the typical different-sex couple
will be recognized as legal parents without taking formal steps, both parents in the typical same-sex couple will lack such legal recognition without additional steps. This would be the case even if, as in the Hawkins
case with which this essay began, both women planned to be parents of
the child and both parented the child for several years.79 As Hawkins
devastatingly illustrates, one parent in the same-sex couple begins from
the default position of legal stranger.80 As Polikoff bluntly states: “The
child of two heterosexuals who are not married has two parents. The child
of two lesbians deserves the same.”81
IV. PARENTAGE REFORM TODAY: PROTECTING
NONBIOLOGICAL PARENTS AND CHILDREN IN
NONMARITAL FAMILIES
Today, biological connection—the very factor invoked to repudiate the
discriminatory regime of illegitimacy and to vindicate parent–child bonds
forged in nonmarital families—is invoked to prop up a new form of discriminatory illegitimacy and to exclude parent–child bonds formed in
nonmarital families. The constitutional precedents that secured rights for
unmarried fathers and their children are cited today to leave unmarried
nonbiological parents without protection and to empower biological parents to shut out nonbiological co-parents. The family law statutes elaborated to attach parental rights and responsibilities to unmarried biological
fathers and to protect nonmarital children are applied today in ways that
render unmarried nonbiological parents legal strangers to their children.
This must change. It is time to shift the law’s understanding of the status of biological connection—an understanding that is not inevitable but
instead emerged from fierce legal and social contestation in the twentieth
century. In the twenty-first century, acceptance of LGBTQ family formation, rising rates of assisted reproduction, declining marriage rates, and
increasingly diverse family arrangements have produced a moment of
76. See PEW RES. CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 9,
11, 111 (2010). Of course, the race and class dimensions of marriage may differ with respect
to LGBTQ people. See GARY J. GATES, DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED
SAME-SEX COUPLES: ANALYSES OF THE 2013 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1–2 (2015).
77. See NeJaime, supra note 29, at 2317.
78. See id. at 2320.
79. See Hawkins v. Grese, 809 S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
80. See id.
81. Polikoff, supra note 9, at 740.
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reckoning—an opportunity to reject and remedy new forms of
illegitimacy.
Legal reform efforts in the twentieth century made visible the forms of
subordination that the illegitimacy regime reflected and perpetuated. The
harsh legal treatment of the nonmarital family constituted part of a
broader legal system that denigrated black and poor families and that
disciplined female sexuality.82 While these equality concerns may not be
obvious on the face of judicial decisions and legislative enactments protecting the rights of nonmarital parents and children, they shaped claims
that courts confronted and motivated advocacy for legislative reform.83
Today, equality concerns are again motivating reform efforts. A parentage regime that affords legal status to unmarried nonbiological parents
would extend recognition to LGBTQ parents and their children and
would protect children regardless of their parents’ marital status—an increasingly urgent need in light of declining marriage rates.84
Courts and lawmakers are acting on these concerns. New York’s highest court recognized the relationship between nonbiological parental recognition and LGBTQ equality in its 2016 Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.
decision.85 Brooke and Elizabeth were in a committed relationship when
they decided to have a child together. Elizabeth gave birth to a child conceived with donor sperm, and the two women raised the child together.86
In fact, after Elizabeth’s maternity leave, Brooke became the child’s primary caretaker.87 When their relationship dissolved, they continued to
co-parent the child. But, as in Hawkins, the biological mother eventually
cut off the child’s contact with the nonbiological mother.88
When confronted with Brooke’s claim for parental recognition, the
court reflected on how the legal landscape had changed in the years since
its 1991 decision in Alison D. v. Virginia M.89 In that case, the court had
denied legal protections to a nonbiological same-sex parent, holding that,
even though the nonbiological mother had “a close and loving relationship with the child, she is not a parent within the meaning of [the law].”90
As “a biological stranger to [the] child,”91 she was simply a nonparent
82. See Appleton, supra note 33, at 351–53; see also, e.g., ANDERS WALKER, THE
GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 3–9 (2009); Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the
Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 107–09 (2003).
83. See Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and the Constitution of Family Status, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 377–78 (2017).
84. See Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child Behind, 48 FAM. L.Q. 495,
495–96 (2014).
85. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
86. Id. at 491.
87. Id.
88. See Douglas NeJaime, The Story of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: Parental Recognition in the Age of LGBT Equality, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES
245, 250 (Melissa Murray, Kate Shaw, & Reva Siegel eds., 2019); Hawkins v. Grese, 809
S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
89. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id.
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seeking to infringe on the biological mother’s authority to exclude third
parties.92 At the time of that decision, no state had permitted same-sex
couples to marry, and no state appellate court had approved second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples.93 Equality for LGBTQ people, at
that moment, was clearly not a judicial or legislative priority.
By the time of Brooke S.B., legal and social views on LGBTQ equality
had changed dramatically. Same-sex couples could marry nationwide—a
right protected by the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of both liberty and
equality.94 Child-rearing had figured centrally in the shift to marriage
equality.95 Rejecting the government’s interest in biological, dual-gender
parenting as a justification for excluding same-sex couples from marriage,
the Court not only accommodated but celebrated same-sex parenting.96
On this view, marriage equality vindicated nonbiological parent-child
relationships.97
The Brooke S.B. court reasoned that marriage equality rendered “Alison D.’s foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and nonrecognition of same-sex couples . . . unsustainable.”98 The “premise of
heterosexual parenting”—sexual procreation and biological parenthood—
presented a problem for the treatment of same-sex couples not only with
respect to marriage but also with respect to nonmarital parenting.99 The
Brooke S.B. court clearly identified the law’s problematic differential
treatment between different-sex and same-sex couples:
Under the current legal framework, which emphasizes biology, it is
impossible—without marriage or adoption—for both former partners of a same-sex couple to have standing [as a legal parent], as only
one can be biologically related to the child. By contrast, where both
partners in a heterosexual couple are biologically related to the child,
both former partners will have standing regardless of marriage or
adoption.100
In order to fully include LGBTQ parents in the parentage regime, the
state needed to supply parental recognition to unmarried nonbiological
parents by operation of law. Such an approach, the court declared, “ensures equality for same-sex parents and provides the opportunity for their
children to have the love and support of two committed parents.”101
In other work, I have examined at length reforms that would produce a
parentage regime that not only treats LGBTQ parents and their children
as fully belonging, but also ensures that children being raised in a range
92. See id. at 29.
93. See NeJaime, supra note 88, at 252.
94. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
95. See id. at 646.
96. See id. at 668, 679; see also Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1239–40 (2016).
97. See NeJaime, supra note 96, at 1240.
98. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016).
99. See id.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 498–99.
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of nonmarital families have the security that legal parentage provides.102
Pathways to parentage must be available to nonbiological parents without
requiring marriage or adoption. To be clear, biological avenues to parentage would remain, but new avenues would be added. At a general level,
parental recognition would arise not only from marital, biological, and
adoptive relations, but also from intentional and functional relations.103
Intent-based parentage rules can address nonbiological parents who
have children through assisted reproduction. As the Brooke S.B. court
concluded, “where a partner shows by clear and convincing evidence that
the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the child together, the
non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek visitation and
custody.”104 If such rules are designed so that they do not distinguish between individuals based on marital status, gender, or sexual orientation,
they have the capacity to recognize a nonbiological unmarried parent as a
legal parent based simply on the person’s consent to assisted reproduction.105 The laws of a growing number of jurisdictions, as well as the 2017
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), take this approach.106 And, following the
UPA, some states now allow intended parents, including unmarried
nonbiological parents, to establish parentage through a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage—an update to the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity maintained in every state.107 On this view, parental
intent is the new biology—ensuring the repudiation of illegitimacy.
Functional, or conduct-based, parentage rules can also protect parent–child relationships that have developed outside of biology, marriage,
or adoption, regardless of whether the family was formed through assisted reproduction. LGBTQ individuals, as well as others in nonmarital
family arrangements, form such parental relationships.108 Recognizing
parentage based on the existence of the parent–child relationship meets
the needs of a diverse range of families and protects children by affording
them the security of legal parentage.109 Common law and equitable doctrines, recently enacted statutes, and the 2017 UPA take this approach.110
A Delaware statute, for example, requires that the person claiming parentage have “acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that
102. See NeJaime, supra note 29, at 2337–47.
103. See id.
104. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490.
105. See Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1222–23 (2010); NeJaime, supra note 29,
at 2345.
106. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); ME.
STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1923 (2020).
107. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.26A.200 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(b) (2021).
108. See Joslin, supra note 84.
109. See Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the Modern Family, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 31, 31 (2018).
110. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2017); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
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is parental in nature.”111 On this view, parental conduct is the new biology—ensuring the repudiation of illegitimacy.
Some jurisdictions have resisted functional parental recognition out of
concern for the constitutional rights of the biological parent.112 On this
view, the biological parent possesses constitutional authority to exclude
the nonbiological parent from the child’s life.113 The nonbiological parent, then, is merely a third party.114 This is true even if the nonbiological
parent is a parent from the child’s perspective.115 That is, the legal determination does not turn on whether, in developmental terms, the person is
a primary attachment figure or, in the famous term of Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Alfred Solnit, a psychological parent.116
Many states have met this constitutional objection to functional parentage by articulating a standard that requires the biological (or adoptive)
parent’s consent or acquiescence to the formation of a parental relationship between the functional parent and the child—a standard that the
nonbiological mother would likely have met in Hawkins.117 As the New
Jersey Supreme Court explained in a case involving an unmarried samesex couple, “the biological or adoptive parent . . . must have fostered the
formation of the parental relationship between the third party and the
child.”118 More specifically, the court reasoned that “the legal parent
[must have] ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority
and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-à-vis
the child that the third party’s status would not otherwise warrant.”119 On
this view, the biological parent who willingly allows another individual to
form a parental relationship with the child cannot later be heard to object
to the other parent’s legal recognition.120
By facilitating the legal recognition of nonbiological parents, this common approach has been critical to the wellbeing of parents and children
in nonmarital families. Nonetheless, it proceeds from problematic assumptions about who is a parent and who is a “third party,” which often
turn on views about biological ties. If biological parental bonds, but not
nonbiological (nonadoptive) parental bonds, bestow special entitlements,
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (2020).
112. See Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting
Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623,
624 & n.7 (2012).
113. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Grese, 809 S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 443–44.
116. See Anne Alstott, Anne Dailey & Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Imperative of Parental Care (manuscript on file).
117. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 718 (“The ‘implied consent’ of de facto parentage
. . . speaks directly to the relevant question: did the biological mother intend to share her
otherwise absolute parental rights with another adult?”).
118. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000).
119. Id.
120. See In re M.F., 475 P.3d 642, 661 (Kan. 2020) (holding that “proof [the biological
mother] implicitly or explicitly consented to share parenting with [the nonbiological
mother] at the time of [the child’s] birth is indispensable to constitutional application of the
statutory presumption at issue”).
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then a conflict between two psychological parents—one who is a biological parent and the other who is a nonbiological parent—appears as a conflict between a parent and a third party. That is, even this more inclusive
approach to functional parentage that many states have adopted depends
on a distinction between parents and nonparents that continues to view
the functional parent presumptively as a nonparent. And even though a
legal or adoptive parent is granted the same right to exclude as a biological parent, this approach still proceeds from the “premise of heterosexual
parenting.”121 It envisions biological parents as the gold standard and
views nonbiological parents skeptically—either as substitute parents created by state law or as outsiders attempting to impinge on the special
status of biological parents.
If instead one views the functional parent as a legal parent, based on
the conduct of that parent, rather than on the consent of the biological or
adoptive parent, one would view the nonbiological parent as possessing
the same rights and responsibilities as the biological or adoptive parent.
The nonbiological parent’s status may arise from developing a relationship with the child that is “parental in nature”122 or by “holding out”123
the child as her own for a statutorily prescribed period of time. Parentage
would not arise merely from exercising caretaking responsibility or helping the other parent, as a stepparent, cohabiting partner, or extended
family member might. Rather, parentage would arise out of assuming the
role of parent.124 On this view, both the functional parent and the other
legal parent would be understood to possess parental rights. Both have
the right to exclude third parties, but neither has the right to exclude each
other.125
As importantly, the nonbiological parent, just like her biological counterpart, has constitutionally protected interests in parental recognition. In
jurisdictions like Virginia that refuse to extend parental recognition as a
family law matter, the nonbiological parent may possess a liberty interest
in the relationship with her child. As Part II explained, when extending
protections to unmarried fathers in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court began with the significance of the biological connection.126
But it also emphasized the act of parenting. Indeed, as the Court continued to consider the claims of unmarried fathers, constitutional protection
121. See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016).
122. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (requiring
that “the individual [claiming de facto parentage] established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child which is parental in nature”).
123. See, e.g., id. § 204(a)(2) (requiring that “the individual resided in the same household with the child for the first two years of the life of the child . . . and openly held out the
child as the individual’s child”).
124. See id.
125. See NeJaime, supra note 26, at 328–29. Cf. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d
161,178 (Wash. 2005) (reasoning that because state “common law recognizes the status of
de facto parents and places them in parity with biological and adoptive parents . . . both
[women] have a ‘fundamental liberty interest[ ]’ in the ‘care, custody, and control’ of [the
child]”) (third alteration in original).
126. NeJaime, supra note 26, at 280.
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came to turn on the social, rather than biological, dimensions of
parenthood.127 As I have explained, “biological paternity was not sufficient to garner constitutional rights. Instead, the Court required that the
man ‘act[ ] as a father.’”128 Moreover, “[w]hen the Court refused to protect the unmarried biological father on constitutional grounds, it usually
cleared the path for a nonbiological father—the man married to the
mother—to enjoy parental status under state law,”129 either by virtue of
adoption or based on the marital presumption.130 Although liberal reformers at the time attempted to attach greater constitutional significance
to the biological tie, the Court’s appeal to the social act of parenting can
support progressive arguments today. The Court’s precedents can bolster
the view that the social act of parenting, rather than the biological tie,
merits constitutional protection.
As I have argued at length, constitutional principles today point toward
the protection of nonbiological parent–child relationships:131
Such protection . . . recognizes the difficult work of parenting that
individuals undertake in a range of family configurations. It values
care work and parental responsibility[,] . . . promotes children’s interests by safeguarding their relationships with their psychological
parents[, and] . . . serves important equality interests.132
In particular, the legal recognition of nonbiological parent–child bonds is
necessary to treat LGBTQ parents as truly belonging.133 Such an approach is not a repudiation of the precedents on unmarried fathers. Instead, it extends and updates key insights from those precedents—valuing
the social dimensions of parenthood and vindicating emergent equality
principles with respect to family arrangements that law and society now
deem worthy of respect.134 Moreover, protecting nonbiological parent–child relationships carries forward commitments to repudiate illegitimacy and provide equal treatment to nonmarital parents and children—
commitments that were forged in an earlier era but retain their
importance.135
Rather than proceed from the assumption that the biological parent,
but not the nonbiological parent, has constitutionally protected rights,
states can act on the understanding that those who have formed parent–child relationships possess interests of constitutional magnitude.136
127. See id.
128. Id. (alteration in original).
129. Id.
130. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing the marital presumption); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (discussing
adoption).
131. See generally NeJaime, supra note 26, at 280.
132. Id. at 355.
133. See id. at 355–58.
134. See id. at 356–57.
135. See id. at 333.
136. See id. at 372 (explaining how states might legislate based on the understanding
that nonbiological parents possess constitutional interests in developed parent-child
relationships).
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Further, the children themselves, who benefit from relationships with
their psychological parents and who experience trauma when such relationships are disrupted, have interests at stake that both family law and
constitutional doctrine can recognize.137 States that have moved to reform their parentage laws—to repudiate the new illegitimacy—have explicitly linked their efforts to the equality interests of LGBTQ parents,
the urgent need to protect children, and the constitutional legacy that
such reform carries forward.138
V. CONCLUSION
Today, the repudiation of illegitimacy requires comprehensive protection for nonbiological parent–child bonds. It requires law and society to
challenge the foundation on which the old illegitimacy was repudiated. It
requires seeing biological connections as a mode of inclusion in
parenthood, rather than a mode of exclusion. It requires appreciating that
the very framework built to accommodate families as they exist and to
repudiate historical forms of subordination, today is being used as a tool
to refuse to accommodate families as they exist and to perpetuate historical forms of subordination. Biological connection, to be sure, has a role to
play in the law of parental recognition. But it has no role to play in excluding families who have long been excluded, in punishing parents who
fail to conform to conventional norms, and in destroying children’s relationships with their psychological parents. For the same reasons that the
law repudiated earlier forms of illegitimacy, it should repudiate modern
illegitimacy. But today, unlike in an earlier era, biological connection
does not provide the path forward and instead simply stands in the way.

137. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS
(2006).
138. See NeJaime, supra note 26, at 329–40.
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